The problem of coordinating a two-echelon green product supply chain with environmentally conscious consumers under demand uncertainty is studied in this paper. In the green product supply chain, a manufacturer produces green product through developing green technology and a retailer promotes the green product through green marketing. The demand of the green product is uncertain with the mean and the variance as the only known information. After analyzing the utility that a consumer gained from the green product, the problem is then formulated as a distribution-free-based Stackelberg game for a decentralized system under three contracts, i.e., wholesale price-only (WPO), revenue and green marketing cost-sharing (RGMS), and two-part tariff (TPTF) contracts. The analytical results are also proposed to show the effects of the system parameters on supply chain optimal decisions. By comparing with the centralized system, the coordination level for each contract is investigated. Numerical examples and sensitivity analysis with respect to several system parameters are presented to illustrate the effectiveness of the contracts under demand uncertainty. The results demonstrate that both RGMS and TPTF contracts are superior to WPO contract. Especially, TPTF contract can always coordinate the supply chain, while RGMS contract can improve the supply chain coordination level only if the revenue and cost sharing coefficients satisfy certain conditions. INDEX TERMS Supply chain, green product, green marketing, coordination, demand uncertainty.
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the last 30 years, due to the increasing requirements of the government and the public for environmental protection, supply chain sustainability has become one of the most important topics and received the most attention in both the industry and academy [1] , [2] . Different from the traditional supply chain which is resource-consuming and environmentally unfriendly, sustainable supply chain can improve resource utilization efficiency and reduce the adverse effects of the manufacturing industry on the environment [3] .
As the preliminary link of the sustainable supply chain, green product innovation has been regarded as one of the important factors to achieve economic growth, energy conservation and environmental sustainability [4] . The green product, also known as the sustainable or environment-friendly The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Saeid Nahavandi. product, is the embodiment of the application of green technology. Companies who engaged in green production can significantly enhance brand image and increase market demand without incurring more resource consumption and environmental deterioration [5] . Considering the advantages of green production, many companies have changed part of their priorities to green product including green product design and its production [6] . The market of green product can be reflected by the rapid growth of environmentally conscious consumers. A global survey conducted among nine developed countries indicates that 50% of the respondents are willing to purchase green products, and 24% of them prefer to pay more on green products [4] . Such result shows the close relationship between consumers' environmental consciousness and supply chain sustainability.
Consumers' knowledge of products determines their actual green purchasing behavior, which partly depends on the green marketing efforts of product suppliers. Since consumers are VOLUME 8, 2020 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License. For more information, see http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ more willing to pay for green product, green reputation, as an accelerator to turn consumers' green awareness into actual purchasing behavior, can be used by companies to raise prices and promote sales [7] . For example, IKEA has reaped many marketing rewards with their green efforts by embracing their underlying purpose in everything they do. The company uses online content to promote its green marketing idea and encourage customers to live a more environmentally conscious lifestyle. Similarly, Nike has launched a sustainable line of shoes called ''The Considered'', which clearly indicated the desire for more sustainable products. Due to the green marketing strategy, the company obtained a high sales volume. Although there are several instances in which green marketing effort make sense, there is still a gap between consumers' positive attitudes and actual actions [8] . In practice, green consciousness does not always lead to green purchasing behavior. Retailers still face the problem of how to translate consumers' environmental awareness into purchasing power. Manufacturers and retailers are core components in the green supply chain. In general, manufacturers design and produce green products to satisfy the demands of consumers with environmental awareness, and then wholesale the product to retailers. The greenness of the green product stands for its environmental attributes. Its level can be adjusted and is proportional to the cost in developing new technologies and product research and development (R&D) cost [9] . The higher the degree of greenness, the larger the R&D cost [8] . Therefore, manufacturers should determine both the green level of the product and the wholesale price. After purchasing the green product from manufacturers, retailers sell the green product to the end consumers. They need to determine the order quantity, as well as the green marketing effort decided by the marketing investment and revenue [10] . The green marketing tools such as environmental advertisements and consumer environmental education can be used to achieve green marketing and develop the ''green reputation'' to promote the sales [11] . Besides, cooperation and coordination between manufacturers and retailers will raise efficiency of the supply chain operation and decrease the cost of production so that the price of the product can be more affordable [12] . Empirical researches also prove that the supply chain can obtain more economical and environmental benefit by integrating green product production, green marketing effort, and remanufacturing used product [13] .
Based on the above background, it is of great practical significance to investigate the impacts of cooperation between manufactures and retailers, together with consumers' environmentally conscious on supply chain decisions and performances. More specifically, we aim to answer the following research questions: (1) How do the manufacturer and the retailer make their decisions when only limited demand information is known? (2) What kind of contracts can fully coordinate the decentralized supply chain system and which contract is attractive to supply chain members? (3) What impacts of system parameters, such as the demand uncertainty level, consumers' preference for product greenness, green marketing cost coefficient, green technology investment cost coefficient, etc. on supply chain decisions and performances?
To address the above questions, this paper considers a two-echelon green supply chain in which the manufacturer designs and produces the green product through developing green technology and the retailer promotes the product through green marketing. More precisely, this study contributes to the existing literature on green supply chain management in several ways. First, the product greenness and the green marketing effort are simultaneously integrated into a supply chain with environmentally conscious consumers. Second, uncertainty is involved in the market size with the mean and the variance as the only known information, and a distribution free-based mathematical model is developed. The closed-form equilibrium solutions are also derived. Third, three contracts including wholesale price-only, revenue and green marketing cost-sharing, and two-part tariff are introduced, and the coordination level for each contract is investigated by comparing the performance of a decentralized supply chain with the centralized system. Furthermore, the impacts of several system parameters on supply chain decisions and performances are examined to illustrate the effectiveness of the contracts under demand uncertainty.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature. Section 3 describes the problem and notations. Section 4 presents benchmark models and solutions for both the decentralized and centralized supply chain system under the WPO contract. Section 5 proposes RGMS and TPTF contracts to coordinate the decentralized supply chain. In section 4, numerical examples and sensitivity analysis are conducted to illustrate the effectiveness of the developed models and solutions. Conclusion and future research directions are presented in Section 7.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
This study is closely relevant to the research on green product production, green marketing effort and sustainable supply chain coordination. In the following, we review studies relevant to each stream and highlight the differences between this study and the existing literature.
The first stream of the research mainly focuses on the green product production in the green or sustainable supply chain management. Integrating green product production is one of the important links in sustainable supply chain management. Designing and producing green products need to invest more, which incurs cost. The conflict between high price and customers' purchase power may dissuade them to buy green products. Some researches on green product production were carried out based on the motivation of finding out a balance between green products and their prices. Zhu and He investigated the green product design issues in supply chains under competition [14] . Their research questions addressed how supply chains' decisions on the ''greenness'' of products are affected by factors such as supply chain structures (centralized and decentralized), the green product types (development-intensive product or marginal-cost intensive product), and the types of competition (price competition and greenness competition). With a game-theoretic approach, they found that supply chain price competition at the retailer level may positively influence the equilibrium greenness while the product greenness competition reduces the equilibrium greenness and the joint impact from price and greenness competition. Jamali and Rasti-Barzoki considered environmental and economic aspect of sustainability, and believed that in these markets, how to compete with nongreen products to produce green products is essential. Therefore, their research focused on pricing and determining how green a product is when competing with non-green products [15] . Xie et al. found that green process innovation has a positive impact on green product innovation, and that both green process innovation and green product innovation can improve a firm's financial performance, collected via the content analysis method, using data from 209 listed companies that belong to heavily polluting manufacturing industries [16] . Medeiros et al. investigates the alignment between environmental sustainability and the product development process of small and medium-sized enterprises, as well as to propose a system to assist the execution of a green product development process [17] .
Although empirical studies reveal that designing, producing and pricing of green product play an important role in sustainable chain management [18] - [20] and some of them emphasize the importance of green marketing innovation, rare research pay attention to the marketing effort in a supply chain and determine its promotion to the green supply chain. Sharma and Iyer devoted to weigh the importance of green marketing in sustainability through reduction in surplus supply and reverse supply of materials and specifically look at the critical interaction of frugal innovation, green marketing and sustainability, and supply chain efficiencies [21] . In the research of Yang et al. [22] , the retailer's promotion can improve the profits of the retailer and the manufacturer when more consumers prefer the retail channel. Liu et al. recognized that green marketing and sustainable supply chain management should be seamlessly integrated so that green customer's needs can be better met by the supply chain capabilities, and they proposed a new hub-and-spoke integration model to integrate green marketing and sustainable supply chain management [23] . Hong and Guo analyzed and modeled a supply chain with environmentally conscious consumers, in which the manufacturer produce green product and the retailer make green marketing effort. They investigate three contracts including price-only, green-marketing costsharing, and two-part tariff contracts to improve the coordination level. The result showed that cooperation among partners is a necessary means to improve the environmental performance of a supply chain especially when consumers are more environmentally conscious [24] . By assuming the firm inaugurates a green product along with its existing product, Raza et al. [25] developed an integrated revenue management framework to address a firm's greening investment effort, pricing and inventory decisions, and identified closed-form solutions.
The last stream of the research is related to green or sustainable supply chain coordination. Tong and Li analyze the decision-making behavior and profits of a competitive supply chain consisting of a green manufacturer, a regular manufacturer, and a retailer under two funding schemes, the results showed that while both government subsidy and greening cost-sharing contract can achieve the goals of increasing a product's degree of greenness and increasing the sales of green products, there are differences between these two methods in reaching these goals [10] . Three coordination contracts, including wholesale price, cost sharing, buyback, to enhance the supply chain' performance are used in noncooperative form and the result showed that supply chain's profit in the cooperative form is higher than non-cooperative one [26] . On the background of an online/offline dual channel, Xie et al. studied contract coordination of centralized and decentralized dual-channel closed-loop supply chains, after comparing of centralized decision and the manufacturing led decentralized decision, the optimal online/offline price, wholesale price and advertising investment are derived [27] . Bai et al. analyzed the decision behavior and coordination mechanisms for a two-echelon sustainable supply chain under a cap-and-trade regulation and considered two contracts including revenue sharing and two-part tariff contracts to coordinate the sustainable supply chain. By analyzing the conditions for a win-win outcome, they proved that only the two-part tariff contract can achieve perfect coordination [28] . Xu et al. studied a two-echelon sustainable supply chain system under carbon cap-and-trade regulation, and propose a revenue and promotional cost-sharing contract and a two-part tariff contract to coordinate this system [29] .
Many researches on sustainable supply chain management consider the coordination and cooperation of manufacturers and retailers. However, most of them assume the market demand is certain [28] - [30] . Our study differs from the existing literature in that the market demand is assumed to be uncertain with only the mean and the variance of the market size are known. Such assumption can also be found in [31] , which developed quantitative models for joint pricing, inventory, and investment for socially responsible decisions for a supply chain. Moreover, we consider simultaneously green product production and green marketing in a two-echelon sustainable supply chain in which the manufacturer design and produce the green product through developing green technology and the retailer promote the product through green marketing. Three contracts: wholesale price-only, revenue and green marketing cost-sharing, and two-part tariff, are investigated to improve the coordination of the decentralized supply chain. Furthermore, several important system parameters such as the demand uncertainty level, consumers' preference for product greenness, green marketing cost coefficient, green technology investment cost coefficient, and so on, on the supply chain decisions and performances are also discussed.
III. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION AND NOTATION
In this study, we consider a two-echelon supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer under demand uncertainty. The manufacturer focuses on producing a green product by implementing green technology investment, and wholesales the product to the retailer who sells it to consumers. We assume that the green product and the traditional product in the market are functionally homogeneous. However, the green product is environmentally friendly, which reflects the environmental attribute. To encourage consumers to buy the green product, the retailer will invest in green marketing, which reflects that consumers are environmentally conscious.
The market demand is assumed to be uncertain with only the mean and the variance are known. This assumption is different from existing literatures that assume the demand is certain or full distribution information of the stochastic demand is exactly known. In this setting, the manufacturer decides the wholesale price and the product greenness, and the retailer decides the order quantity and the green marketing effort. We model the problem as a Stackelberg game in which the manufacturer is the leader, while the retailer is the follower.
In the game, the manufacturer invests in green technology to produce the green product. Denote e (e ∈ (0, 1)) as product greenness, which influences the green technology investment level. In general, the higher the level of the greenness, the larger the investment cost. We define the investment cost as a quadratic function of the level of greenness, i.e., βe 2 , where β is the cost coefficient of green technology development. Unsurprisingly, a higher level of greenness raises the difficulty of improving product greenness, such that a higher cost is incurred.
To promote the green product to consumers, the retailer invests in green marketing. Denote t as the effort for green marketing, which induces the green marketing cost αt 2 , where α is the cost coefficient. According to Hong and Guo [24] , the technology investment has a higher investment threshold than marketing, we assume that α < β.
Consumers make their purchase decisions by evaluating the utilities from the green product. Note that, the green product has both the functional and the environmental attributes. Therefore, the utility a consumer gained includes two parts, one is from the functional attribute, and the other is from environmental attribute. We denote u as the consumer's utility from the functional attribute. u is a nonnegative random variable with the cumulative distribution function F(·), which implies that consumers are heterogeneous in evaluating the functional attribute of green product. However, since all consumers are environmentally conscious, we assume that consumers are homogeneous in evaluating the environmental attribute of the green product. More precisely, define a linear function, i.e., ke, as the utility that consumers gained from the environmental attribute, where k is consumers' preference for product greenness. Moreover, the retailer's green marketing effort can also increase consumers' utility. Denote p as the retail price of the green product, then the total utility that a consumer gained from the green product can be formulated as
Such a linear utility function can also be found in [24] , [32] . The consumer will buy the green product only when U > 0. Let N be the potential market size, then the demand of the green product is
Without the loss of generality, we assume u is uniformly distributed on the interval [0, 1], which means that the demand can be rewritten as
Different from the existing literatures that assume the market size N is known and normalized to be 1, we assume that N is a random variable with cumulative distribution function G(·). Especially, only the mean (µ) and the variance (σ 2 ) of N are assumed to be known. Then the problem becomes how the manufacturer and the retailer make their decisions against the market demand uncertainty. The optimization problem with the unknown demand distribution is also referred as the distribution-free problem, which can be found in many sustainable supply chain literatures (Liu et al., 2015; Bai and Chen, 2016; Xu et al., 2018). Different from the above literatures, this paper mainly focuses on the green supply chain coordination by using different contracts.In the next section, we model the problem as a distribution-free-based Stackelberg game for a decentralized supply chain system, and then derive the optimal decisions for the manufacture and the retailer. Furthermore, a distribution-free-based decision model for the centralized supply chain system is also proposed. The symbols and notation used in this study are listed in Table 1 .
IV. MODEL DEVELOPMENT AND ANALYSIS
In this section, we first consider the decentralized supply chain in which the manufacture is the leader who decides the wholesale price w and the product greenness e, and the retailer is the follower who decides the order quantity Q and green marketing effort t. After that, the centralized system is investigated and regarded as the benchmark to design the coordination mechanism.
A. DECENTRALIZED SYSTEM Backward induction is used to find the equilibrium of the Stackelberg game. We first consider the retailer's decision problem. For given manufacturer's wholesale price and greenness, the retailer's profit maximization problem can be 
Similarly, the standard of the demand isσ = (1 − p + ke + t)σ . Clearly, problem (4) can be solved by stochastic programming if the distribution of the market size N , i.e., G(·), is known exactly. However, the distribution G(·) of N is usually unknown in practice, which prompts us to maximizing π r against the worst possible distribution. According to Gallego and Moon [36] , we have the following Lemma 1.
Lemma 1:
Under Lemma 1, solving problem (4) is equivalent to solve the following problem, i.e., max Q,t
Note that, the hessian matrix of π r isn't always negative definite, implying that π r isn't jointly concave with Q and t. However, for given t, we find π r is concave with Q. By solving the following problem, we can then obtain the optimal order quantity.
It can be seen that the objective function φ(Q) in problem (6) is convex with Q, by taking the first derivative of φ(Q) with respect to Q, and let it equal to zero, i.e., let ∂φ(Q)/∂Q = 0, we obtain the optimal Q with respect to t as stated below 7) where ρ = (p − w)/w is the cost-plus coefficient. By substituting (7) into (5), we have the following profit maximization problem for the retailer, i.e.,
Since ∂ 2 π r /∂t 2 = −α/2 < 0, which indicates that the objective function π r in (8) is concave with t. By take the first derivative of π r with respect to t, and let it equal to zero, i.e.,
we have the optimal green marketing effort in response to the manufacturer's decisions of w and e as
Also, we obtain the optimal order quantity in response to the manufacturer's decisions of w and e as
Since the retailer's green marketing effort cannot be negative, we assume that 2ρµ − (2 + ρ)σ √ ρ + σ √ 1/ρ > 0, without the loss of generality. Based on (9) and (10), we address the retailer's optimal decisions in the following Proposition.
Proposition 1: For given manufacturer's decisions of w and e, the retailer's optimal green marketing effort and order quantity are
. From (10), we find that, for given wholesale price, the retailer will place an order larger (smaller) than the expected demand if and only if ρ > 1 (ρ < 1). That is, the optimal order size is larger or smaller than the expected demand if and only if the cost-plus ratio is larger or smaller than one. It can also be found from proposition 1 that the larger the manufacturer's wholesale price, the higher the retailer's green marketing effort and order quantity. However, although the higher product greenness can stimulate the retailer to increase its order size, it has no influence on the retailer's green marketing effort.
Corollary 1: For given w and e, the retailer's order quantity has the following elasticities with respect to the mean and standard variation, respectively
From Corollary 1, it can be seen that the retailer's order decision is increasing with the expected market size. However, when investigating the changing tendency of retailer's order quantity with respect to the degree of market fluctuation, σ , we find it significantly depends on the cost-plus ratio ρ. A higher cost-plus ratio means a higher retail price, which induces the retailer to increase the order quantity, and vice versa. Typically, the retailer's order quantity is not influenced by σ when ρ = 1.
Next, we continue to consider the manufacturer's profit maximization problem as follows
By substituting (10) into (11), we have the manufacturer's profit maximization problem as
To solve problem (12) , we need to ensure that the hessian matrix of π m is negative definite.
< 0, which also indicates that λ 4α −1−ρ < 0. Under this condition, the hessian matrix of π m is negative definite. Recall (10), we have the elasticity of Q * (w, e) with respect to w as ∂Q * (w, e)/∂w
implying that the higher the manufacturer's wholesale price, the smaller the retailer's order quantity. This result is consistent with that of newsboy model. Therefore, to ensure that problem (12) has solutions, we assume that
By taking the first derivative of π m with respect to w and e, and let them equal to zeros, i.e., ∂π m ∂w = 0 and ∂π m ∂e = 0, respectively, we obtain the following equations
By solving the above equations, the optimal wholesale price and greenness are as follows
Note that, the optimal product greenness, e * , should be nonnegative, implying that the condition c( λ 4α − 1 − ρ) + 1 < 0 must hold. Substituting (13) and (14) into (9) and (10), the Stackelberg equilibrium can be addressed in Theorem 1 below.
Theorem 1: The Stackelberg equilibrium of the green product supply chain under wholesale price-only contract is
Corollary 2:
(1) ∂w * /∂k > 0, ∂e * /∂k > 0, ∂t * /∂k > 0, ∂Q * /∂k > 0; (2) ∂w * /∂α < 0, ∂e * /∂α < 0, ∂t * /∂α < 0, ∂Q * /∂α < 0; (3) ∂w * /∂β < 0, ∂e * /∂β < 0, ∂t * /∂β < 0, ∂Q * /∂β < 0
The above Corollary 2(1) indicates that the consumers' higher preference for green product will promote the manufacturer to increase the greenness, and induce the retailer to make more effort on green marketing and increase the order size. Since the greener product will shift more costs, the manufacturer can raise the wholesale price. Corollary 2(2) and 2(3) indicates that the higher the green technology investment cost (green marketing cost), the lower (higher) the greenness and green marketing effort.
Based on Theorem 1, the retailer's, the manufacturer's and the overall supply chain profits are calculated as follows
Note that, the above decentralized supply chain can also be considered as the decentralized system under the wholesale price-only (WPO) contract. For comparison, results in Proposition 1 and Theorem 1 are referred as decisions under the WPO contract.
B. CENTRALIZED SYSTEM
In a centralized system, the manufacturer and the retailer are vertically integrated in the same system. The objective of the centralized system is to determine the optimal order quantity, green marketing effort, and product greenness to maximize the total expected profit. The expected profit of the centralized system is
Under the aforementioned Lemma 1, the profit maximization problem of a centralized supply chain system can be formulated as
Following the similar logic of Proposition 1, the retailer's order quantity, for given (t, e), can be derived as
where θ = (p − c)/c. Substituting (17) into (16), we obtain the following maximization problem we regard to (t, e).
By solving problem (18), we address the optimal decisions for the centralized system in the following Theorem 2.
Theorem 2: The optimal decisions for the centralized supply chain can be determined as
Corollary 3: ∂t * C /∂α < 0, ∂Q * C /∂α < 0, ∂e * C /∂β < 0, ∂Q * C /∂β < 0, ∂e * C /∂k > 0, and ∂Q * C /∂k > 0. From Theorem 2, it can be found that the green marketing effort and the product greenness are influenced by the green marketing cost coefficient α and the green technology investment cost coefficient β respectively, while the order quantity is affected by both α and β. Corollary 3 indicates that the more the parameter α, the less the green marketing effort and the retailer's order quantity. The manufacturer will decrease the product greenness if the green technology investment cost is too high, which will cause the retailer to order less products. Unsurprisingly, the consumers' higher preference for product greenness will stimulate the manufacturer to produce greener products and the retailer to order more green products.
Inputting the optimal solutions of t * C , e * C , and Q * C into the objective function of (18), we obtain the entire supply chain profit as π * C = ηc(2αβ−4αβc+4αβθc+αηck 2 −2αβk+βηc) 8αβ
. When comparing the decisions in centralized system with those in decentralized system, we find that the wholesale priceonly contract may coordinate the supply chain if and only if w = c, which implies that the manufacturer will gain negative profits due to the investment in green technology. Undoubtedly, the manufacturer will never implement such a wholesale pricing decision, unless there exists extra sources of revenue. In the next section, two kinds of coordination mechanisms are designed to improve the decentralized supply chain performance.
V. COORDINATION MECHANISM DESIGN A. REVENUE AND GREEN MARKETING COST-SHARING CONTRACT
In section 3.1, we consider the wholesale price-only contract and find that it cannot coordinate the supply chain. This is because the manufacturer and the retailer only focus on their own revenue and cost without considering cooperation. To encourage the retailer to cooperate, a revenue and green marketing cost-sharing (RMCS) contract is introduced in this section. In RMCS contract, the retailer retains a fraction ϕ of the revenue, while the manufacturer obtains 1 − ϕ of the retailer's revenue. In return, the manufacturer shares a fraction δ of the retailer's green marketing cost. The retailer's profit will then be
For given manufacturer's decisions w and e, the retailer's profit maximization problem can be described as
By solving the above problem (20) , we obtain the retailer's decisions as follows
). Under RMCS contract, the manufacturer's profit is given by
We are interested in how the manufacturer can design RMCS contract to improve the supply chain performance. Recall that in centralized system, the optimal decisions are t * C , e * C , and Q * C . Let Q * S (w, e; ϕ, δ) = Q * C and t * S (w, e; ϕ, δ) = t * C , we obtain
However, on the basis of the retailer's response, the manufacturer's decision problem is
By solving the above problem, the manufacturer's optimal wholesale price and greenness decisions are
The supply chain can be perfectly coordinated if and only if there exists some values of ϕ and δ such that w S = w * S , e S = e * S = e C . If there is no such values of ϕ and δ, we want to find some acceptable ϕ and δ under which the supply chain performance can be improved, while both the manufacturer's and the retailer's profits are superior to those under WPO contract, i.e., (ϕ, δ) = {(ϕ, δ)|π S * r ≥ π * r , π S * m ≥ π * m , π * S ≥ π * }, where π * S = π S * r +π S * m , π S * r and π S * m are profits of the retailer and the manufacturer under RMCS contract, respectively.
B. TWO-PART TARIFF CONTRACT
In a two-part tariff (TPTF) contract, the manufacturer will charge a lower wholesale price w and a fixed cost F to the retailer. The retailer will make decisions of the order quantity Q and green marketing effort t that are consistent with that of the centralized system only if the manufacturer makes the product greenness e that is consistent with that of the centralized system. In this case, the profit maximization problems of the retailer is max Q,t
Following the same derivation procedure as in section IV, we obtain the retailer's effort on green marketing and order quantity as follows
Comparing (24) and (25) with (9) and (10), we find that the fixed cost charged by the manufacturer does not influence the retailer's decisions under TPTF contract. However, the manufacturer can make different decisions under different mechanism such as wholesale price-only contract, cost sharing contract, and so on. Based upon (24) and (25), the profit maximization problem of the manufacturer can be formulated as max
VI. NUMERICAL ANALYSIS
In this section, numerical example with sensitivity analysis are presented to illustrate the results obtained in sections IV and V and to gain some managerial insights.
A. NUMERICAL EXAMPLE
In this example, we focus on comparing the supply chain decisions and performances under three contracts including WPO, RGMS and TPTF. The basic parameter values are set as c = 0.2, α = 3, β = 5, k = 1, µ = 5, σ = 1, ρ = 2. According to the theoretical results proposed in sections IV and V, we obtain the numerical results as listed in Table 1 below. It can be found from Table 1 that the decentralized supply chain achieves the lowest profit under WPO contract, and the channel efficiency loss is 30% ( 1.10−0.77 1.10 ×100%). Unsurprisingly, TPTF contact can perfectly coordinate the supply chain due to the profit of the decentralized system is consistent to that of the centralized one. Especially, comparing with the results under WPO contract, it can also be found that the manufacturer can use TPTF contract to improve its profit significantly. As for RGMS contract, we find that there exists some values of ϕ and δ (for example, ϕ = 0.48 and δ = 0.75) such that both the manufacturer's and the retailer's profits are no less that those under WPO contract (see the values of π r and π m in the 3 rd and 4 th columns in Table 2 ). When observing the product greenness, we find that the manufacturer would pay more to implementing the highest greenness decision under RGMS contract, which prompt the retailer to order more since the consumers are environmentally conscious. Moreover, comparing supply chain members' profits under the above three contracts, it can be found that RGMS contract is beneficial to the retailer, while TPTF contract is beneficial to the manufacturer.
B. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we continue to investigate the effects of some system parameters such as σ, α, β, and k on supply chain decisions and performances. The sensitivity analysis is performed by changing each of the parameters, taking one parameter at a time and keeping others unchanged.
1) THE EFFECTS OF σ ON SUPPLY CHAIN DECISIONS AND PERFORMANCES
To analyze the effects of σ on supply chain decisions and performances, σ is set to start from 0 to 1 in increments of 0.1. Under each value of σ , we calculate the supply chain decisions such as order quantity, green marketing effort, and product greenness, together with the manufacturer's and the retailer's profits. The results are shown in Tables 3-4 and Figures 1-3 . Form Table 3 , it can be seen that the order quantity under each contract, i.e., WPO, RGMS and TPTF, is decreasing with σ . Note that, the parameter σ measures the uncertainty degree of the market size, which means the retailer will reduce the order quantity when the volatility of the market demand is too much. However, both RGMS and TPTF contracts will stimulate the retailer to order more than WPO contract. Similar changing tendencies can also be found from Table 4 , i.e., the retailer's green marketing effort is decreasing with σ . Interestingly, we find that although RGMS and TPTF contracts can improve the supply chain performance, WPO contract induces the highest green marketing effort. When investigating the effect of σ on the manufacturer's greenness decision, we find from Figure 3 that the optimal greenness is also decreasing with σ . Especially, both RGMS and TPTF contracts will encourage the manufacturer to enhance the product greenness, which is different from the result displayed in Table 4 that WPO contract will encourage the retailer to make more green marketing effort. Figures 2-3 displays the changing tendencies of the manufacturer's and the retailer's profit with respect to σ . From Figure 3 , we find that the manufacturer's profits under three contracts are all decreasing with σ , while the retailer's profits does not maintain the same changing tendency. For example, the retailer's profits under RGMS and TPTF contracts are increasing with σ . Recall that, TPTF contract can perfectly coordinate the supply chain, which induce that the manufacturer obtains the highest profit, comparing with the RGMS and WPO contract. Moreover, the manufacturer can obtain more profit under RGMS contract than that under WPO contract. However, the retailer will obtain the highest profit under RGMS contract, which indicates that the TPTF contract is beneficial to the manufacturer, while the RGMS contract is beneficial to the retailer. Unsurprisingly, among the three contracts, WPO contract will induce the lowest profit performances for both the manufacturer and the retailer.
2) EFFECTS OF k ON SUPPLY CHAIN DECISIONS AND PERFORMANCES
In order to analyze the effects of the consumers' preference for product greenness, k, on supply chain decisions and supply chain members' profits, we set k to start from 0.5 to 1.5 in increments of 0.2. For each contract, the order quantities, green marketing efforts, and the product greenness, and the manufacturer's and retailer's profits are then calculated under different k. The results are displayed in Tables 5-6 and Figures 4-6. From Table 5 , it can be found that consumers with high green awareness will prompt the retailer to increase the order quantity under the above three contracts. Among the three contracts, WPO contract leads to the minimum order quantity. Furthermore, TPTF contract can result in the maximum order quantity only when k is relatively small. It can be seen from Table 6 that the consumers' preference for product greenness has a positive effect on the retailer's green marketing effort under WPO contract. However, under both RGMS and TPTF contracts, the green marketing effort remains unaffected, no matter how the consumers' preference for product greenness changes.
When investigating the effect of the consumers' preference for product greenness on the product greenness, we find form Figure 4 that the larger the parameter k, the higher the product greenness e * , which indicates that consumers with high green awareness will stimulate the manufacturer to develop green technology to produce green products. Specially, the manufacture will determine the highest (lowest) level of product greenness under RGMS (WPO) contract. Note that, the higher green awareness will lead to the higher product greenness and then increase the market demand, which will benefit the retailer who makes green marketing effort to increase its profit. This can be found form Figure 6 . However, From Figure 5 , we find that the higher green awareness cannot always benefit the manufacturer. For example, although the manufacturer's profit under WPO contract or TPTF contract is increasing with k, it is decreasing with k under RGMS contract. Interestingly, comparing the three contracts, we find that RGMS contract is always attractive to the retailer when k changes. However, the manufacturer will prefer RGMS contract only when k is relatively small. As k becomes large, TPTF contract will be more attractive to the manufacturer.
3) EFFECTS OF α ON SUPPLY CHAIN DECISIONS AND PERFORMANCES
To further examine the effects of the green marketing cost coefficient, α, on supply chain decisions and the manufacturer's and the retailer's profits under the three contracts, we set α to start from 2.5 to 4.5 in increments of 0.5. The results are shown in Tables 7-8 and Figures 7-9 . Under each contract, Tables 7-8 displays decreasing tendencies of order quantity and green marketing effort with respect to α, respectively. These results are intuitive because a higher α will induce the retailer to make less green marketing effort to reduce the cost, which in turn decreases the demand. As a result, the order quantity is decreasing with α. However, it can also be found that the retailer will order more green products under RGMS contract, while make less marketing effort. On the contrary, the retailer will order less green product under WPO contract, while make more marketing effort. When investigating the effects of α on the product greenness, we find from Figure 7 that the parameter α has no effects on the product greenness under both RGMS contract and TPTF contract, although it affects the greenness slightly under WPO contract. Figure 8 and Figure 9 display the similar changing tendency to Figure 2 and Figure 3 , respectively. That is, both parameters α and σ have similar effects on the manufacturer's and the retailer's profits. Especially, the manufacturer will prefer to offer TPTF contract since it can obtain the highest profit, while the retailer will be more interested in RGMS contract, no matter how the parameter α changes.
4) EFFECTS OF β ON SUPPLY CHAIN DECISIONS AND PERFORMANCES
Since the manufacturer designs and produces the green product by investing in developing green technology, the green technology investment cost coefficient, β, will significantly affect the corresponding decisions as well as the supply chain members' profits. In order to analyze the effects of β on supply chain decisions and performances, β is set to start from 4 to 6 in increments of 0.5. The results are displayed in Tables 9-10 and Figures 10-12. Comparing Table 9 with Table 7 , it can be found that the green technology investment cost coefficient β and the green marketing cost coefficient α have the similar effect on the order quantity. That is, the higher the value of β, the less the order quantity. Moreover, Table 10 indicates that the parameter β only affects the green marketing effort under WPO contract. Recall that, WPO contract cannot improve the supply chain performance, which implies that it is unattractive to both the manufacturer and the retailer. We can then conclude that β has no effect on the green marketing effort. From Figure 10 , it can be seen that the product greenness is decreasing with β under the three contracts. Note that, for fixed product greenness, a higher β implies that the manufacturer will pay more on developing green technology. To avoid excessive investment cost, the manufacturer will lower the product greenness. Figure 11 -12 display the changing tendencies of the manufacturer's and the retailer's profits with respect to β under the three contracts, respectively. From Figure 11 , it can be seen that the manufacturer's profit is decreasing with β under WPO contract and TPTF contract. In contrast, the manufacturer's profit is increasing with β under RGMS contract, which is because the manufacturer can share a fraction of the retailer's revenue. From Figure 12 , it can be seen that the retailer's profit is decreasing with β under the three contract, no matter how the parameter β changes. Similarly, comparing the manufacturer's and the retailer's profits under the three contracts, we find that the manufacturer will prefer to offer TPTF contract, while the retailer will be more interested in RGMS contract.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper studied the coordination problem of a twoechelon green product supply chain with environmentally conscious consumers under different contracts. The manufacturer designs and produces green product through developing green technology, and the retailer promotes the green product in its marketplace through green marketing. The demand is assumed to be uncertain with only the mean and the variation as the only known information. For each contract, the problem was formulated as a distributionfree-based Stackelberg game for a decentralized system, and analytical results were proposed to show the effects of the system parameters on the supply chain optimal decisions.
Numerical examples and sensitivity analysis with system parameters were also conducted to illustrate the effectiveness of the contracts. From the results, we obtained some interesting managerial insights as follows: (1) RGMS and TPTF contracts are superior to WPO contract. Especially, TPTF contract can always coordinate the supply chain, while RGMS contract can improve the supply chain coordination level only if the revenue and cost sharing coefficients satisfy certain conditions, which indicates that cooperation among supply chain members can improve the system performance; (2) Although RGMS contract is always attractive to the retailer, the manufacture will prefer to off TPTF contract, especially when consumers are more environmentally conscious; (3) The increase of the demand uncertainty will damage the manufacturer's profit, this is not the case for the retailer under RGMS and TPTF contracts, which provides motivation for the manufacturer to cooperate with the retailer to improve the demand prediction accuracy; (4) The increase of consumers' environmental consciousness will stimulate the manufacturer to produce greener products, which will in return increase both of the members' profits under WPO and TPTF coordination mechanisms. Therefore, both governments and enterprises should make incentive policies to raise consumers' environmental awareness.
However, there are some limitations, and opportunities exist to enrich this study. Firstly, two different products with consistent functionality can be considered into our models with one is sold through an online channel, while another is sold through a traditional channel. It would be interesting to study the competition between these two channels and products. Secondly, this study provides an approach to make supply chain decisions under demand uncertainty, it, however, does not examine the effectiveness of proposed models and solutions in hedging against demand uncertainty. In future, we plan to use real case to compare and analyze the effectiveness of proposed models and solutions. At last, since the demand uncertainty will inevitably incurs risk, the risk preferences of the decision makers can also be considered by introducing some risk measurements such as value-at-risk, conditional value-at-risk, and so on. This would benefit the practice of the sustainable supply chain management under uncertainty.
APPENDIX PROOF OF THEOREM 2
To solve problem (18) , we need to determine whether the function π is concave with (t, e). Note that, ∂π
= 4αβ > 0, which implies that π is jointly concave with t and e. Then, by taking the first derivative of π with respect to t and e, and let them equal to zeros, respectively. We obtain the following s
By solving the above equations, the optimal greenness and marketing effort are
,
, and the optimal order quantity is 
